Portable scope certificate

Proof of containment, not a promise

Every marketplace in this category claims that out-of-scope calls are blocked. This page emits a self-contained certificate you can re-derive from chain state yourself — with cast or viem, no GuardRail server involved. The commitment below is a keccak256 over exactly the fields that define the agent's authority.

listing #1 listing #2 listing #3 listing #4

Verdict

CONTAINED — the agent's authority is real, live, and bounded as declared

SubjectGuardRail Health Guard (listing #4)

CategoryHealth Factor Monitoring

Agent wallet0xa847F3BB…0dB5be97

Session key0xc03502ed…19ec0db9

Pinned block121331141

Issued2026-09-11T21:07:22.000Z

Declared authority

Allowlist size: 2 contract(s)
Cap: 0.02 BNB / 24h
Marketplace says live: true
KeyStore says live: true
Independent sources agree: true
trustScore: 100/100

allowlist: 0x10ED43…56024E, 0xbb4CdB…bc095c

Commitment

0xfc53142ff36474cd41a56fd4f115a72e0cff3e1c7a8e817fcdbd43f0db0cc3be

Anyone can reproduce this certificate from chain state alone — no GuardRail server involved.

1. Read scopeAudit(4) and listingSummary(4) from 0xb7c80f5154952E48f6E1548282343000c45b80d6 at block 121331141 on chain 56.
2. Read isValidKey(agentWallet, sessionKeyId) from the Altana KeyStore 0x6572427ED530BadcF7375Cf9A4709D8d2b0E7E0a at the SAME block.
3. keccak256(abi.encode(marketplace, listingId, agentWallet, sessionKeyId, capToken, capLimit, capPeriod, sortedAllowlist)) — compare to scopeCommitment.
4. If the hash matches and both sources agree, the containment claim is verified by construction, not by assertion.

Reproduce it yourself

# 1. read the scope at the pinned block (archive-capable RPC for old heights)
cast call 0xb7c80f5154952E48f6E1548282343000c45b80d6 \
  "scopeAudit(uint256)(address,bytes32,address,uint256,uint256,address[],bool,bool)" \
  4 --block 121331141 --rpc-url <RPC>

# 2. ask the KeyStore independently
cast call 0x6572427ED530BadcF7375Cf9A4709D8d2b0E7E0a "isValidKey(address,bytes32)(bool)" \
  0xa847F3BBF69e8A888b59BC8729ce787E0dB5be97 0xc03502ed01064695f2925774bbde87304e9a65ae4e0359a89e1c95bb19ec0db9 --rpc-url <RPC>

# 3. recompute the commitment (fields sorted by contract address)
cast keccak $(cast abi-encode \
  "f(address,uint256,address,bytes32,address,uint256,uint256,address[])" \
  0xb7c80f5154952E48f6E1548282343000c45b80d6 4 \
  0xa847F3BBF69e8A888b59BC8729ce787E0dB5be97 0xc03502ed01064695f2925774bbde87304e9a65ae4e0359a89e1c95bb19ec0db9 \
  0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 20000000000000000 \
  86400 \
  "[0x10ED43C718714eb63d5aA57B78B54704E256024E,0xbb4CdB9CBd36B01bD1cBaEBF2De08d9173bc095c]")

# → must equal 0xfc53142ff36474cd41a56fd4f115a72e0cff3e1c7a8e817fcdbd43f0db0cc3be

# 4. machine-readable form
curl "https://guardrail-delta.vercel.app/api/scope-certificate?listingId=4"

Re-read at the exact pinnedBlock with an archive-capable RPC. Public BSC RPCs prune old state (they answer `missing trie node` for historical eth_call), which is why the certificate defaults to the latest block; the blockHash is included so the height is unambiguous.

The certificate is derived, not asserted. If the session is revoked, the listing paused, or the declared scope changes, the verdict and the commitment both change — and a third party recomputing from the same block will see the same result.